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CONSPIRACY AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
FROM CRIMMINS TO FEOLA
MARK BERGERt

I.

INTRODUCTION

B

Y THE LAST QUARTER OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,
AMERICANS have accustomed themselves to wide-ranging
federal authority over the enforcement of criminal laws.' Federal law
enforcement power today is exercised not only in jurisdictions
directly administered by the national government, 2 but in all
geographical areas of the United States and over a wide range of
conduct. 3 Indeed, federal criminal legislation has so proliferated that
Congress has felt compelled to give serious consideration to a
comprehensive reform and consolidation of the federal criminal
code. 4 Along with the expansion of federal criminal law has come
growth in the federal investigatory apparatus assigned to enforce it.
Included in this development has been the establishment and
enlargement of such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 the Drug Enforcement Administration, 6 and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 7 The federal enforcement machinery
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
A.B., Columbia University, 1966; J.D., Yale Law School, 1969.
1. The bulk of federal criminal legislation is contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-2520
(1970), but there are many criminal penalties provided for elsewhere in the United
States Code. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (1970) (liquor tax criminal penalties). In referring to
the expanded scope of federal criminal jurisdiction into areas previously unregulated
by the national government, the working papers of the National Commission on
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission) observe that "[t]hese
offenses have been on the books for too long a period to permit a return of the status
of Federal criminal law to what it was in the 19th century." NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 35 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WORKING PAPERS].
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
3. See Id. §§ 3231-3243 (1970). If the conduct meets the statutory jurisdictional
criteria, it may be the basis of a federal prosecution wherever it has occurred in the
United States. E.g., Id. § 111 (1970) (assaulting a federal officer). In limited
circumstances, offenses committed outside of the territorial United States may be
subject to federal prosecution. E.G., Id. § 2381 (1970) (treason).

4. See

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL

REPORT (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROWN REPORT]. Hearings have been held on the
Commission's report. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws before the
Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). A number of alternative federal criminal code reform bills
have also been introduced. E.g., S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 531-537 (1970).
6. See Id. § 509 (Supp. V 1976).
7. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (§ 3(2)) (Supp. V 1975). (bureau's role in Transportation
Cargo Security Program as stated in Executive Order No. 11836).

(554)
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and the laws it safeguards now constitute an important segment of
the American system of criminal justice.8
Undoubtedly, the current status of the federal role in law
enforcement would have come as quite a surprise to the framers of
the Constitution. The structure of the Constitution suggests that
they envisioned a national government of limited powers, one of the
most severely limited of which was the authority to enforce the
criminal law. Instead, that function was to be performed by the
states. Where. the Constitution did recognize special national
interests, federal use of the criminal sanction to protect those
interests was seemingly approved; 9 however, a more general
authority for a national criminal code was not granted. 10 In line with
this philosophy, the earliest federal criminal legislation avoided
duplicating or supplementing state restrictions, focusing instead
upon distinctly national concerns."
American society today, of course, is far different from what it
was in 1789. Its growth, in both size and complexity, has
significantly increased the need for a federal role in criminal law
enforcement. The result has been the expansion of federal criminal
legislation beyond the early confines of the protection of distinctly
national interests. The newer breed of federal criminal statutes are
aimed to a greater extent at supplementing existing state law. The
logic behind this development lies partly in the greater mobility of
offenders and complexity of offenses which do not respect state
lines.' 2 In addition, the laxity of state enforcement may have
contributed to the need for federal intervention in some areas.' 3
8. Approximately 52,525 criminal defendants were handled by the federal
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

district courts in fiscal year 1972.

COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

1972, at 3 (1975).

Beyond numbers, the federal justice system has a major role as a model and standard
and has been referred to by the Supreme Court in reaching decisions controlling state
practice. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-87 (1966).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(6) (punishment of counterfeiting); id. art. I, § 8(10)
(piracy and maritime offenses); id. art. IV, § 3(2) (power over property and territories
belonging to the United States).
10. The Constitution, in providing for extradition, minimized the need for a
federal criminal code. See id. art. IV, § 2(2). Conduct criminal in the state of
commission would not escape punishment if the actor fled to another state due to the
power to extradite. No federal substantive criminal law would be needed to handle
this problem.
11. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 46 (1789) (revenue frauds); 1 Stat. 112-19 (1790) (interference
with federal justice and general penal code for federal territories).
12. Federal law punishing the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles is
illustrative of federal criminal provisions responding to the interstate mobility of
defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970). The comprehensive federal narcotics
regulations and criminal penalties respond to the need for uniform standards
covering the illicit interstate trade in narcotic drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
13. The Mann Act and the criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Acts are of this
variety. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970) (Mann Act); id. § 241 (criminal provisions of
the Civil Rights Act).
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Nevertheless, neither the character of American society nor the
Constitution dictates that state law enforcement responsibilities be
overwhelmed by the federal government. Thoughtful planning is
needed to ensure a proper balance between the states and the federal
government in allocating criminal law authority.
The application of federal jurisdiction to the enforcement of
conspiracy laws is a particularly troublesome area in which to
balance state and federal interests. On the one hand, conspiracy can
be viewed simply as an inchoate crime, the prohibition of an
agreement to commit an illegal act. 14 As such, it becomes entirely
proper for federal jurisdiction to be asserted as vigorously in the
suppression of conspiracies as in their substantive illegal objects.
Yet, there are strong arguments that conspiracy jurisdiction ought to
be more restrictively exerted. For example, the fact that conspiracy
allows for extremely early legal intervention - at the point of an
agreement which can substantially precede the conduct constituting
an attempt - suggests that whatever danger or threat to federal
interests may exist can be far less than the concern which motivated
criminalizing the conspiracy's object.' 5 This lesser threat may
warrant more restrictive jurisdiction.
It is also true that conspiracy itself is a severely criticized
doctrine. 16 Efforts to expand federal use of the conspiracy tool,
therefore, should be carefully guarded, particularly where federal
enforcement can upset the delicate balance between state and federal
14. Federal law defines conspiracy as occurring when "two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States." Id. § 371. The agreement is the essence of the prohibited conduct. See
Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1942). However, the object of the
agreement need not itself be a criminal act if it constitutes fraud against the United
States. See generally Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE
L.J. 405 (1959).
15. While there is no general federal attempt statute, many federal criminal
statutes cover attempts to commit the acts prohibited. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1970)
(interference with court orders). However, since there is no indication of how close one
must be to commission of the act before an attempt has been completed, confusion has
resulted. Compare United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 920 (1952), with United States v. Robles, 185 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal. 1960). The
conspiracy statute requires merely that one of the conspirators "do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy." The purpose of the overt act requirement "is simply to
manifest 'that the conspiracy is at work.'" Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334
(1957), quoting Carlson v. United States, 187 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1951). As in
Yates, this requirement may be satisfied by a showing of innocent conduct.
16. The literature critical of conspiracy doctrine is extensive. See, e.g., Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Johnson, The
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1137 (1973); Developments in the
Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920 (1959); Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crimes or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62
HARv. L. REV. 276, 285-86 (1948); Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79
YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
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responsibilities 17 and where federal prosecution does not preclude
parallel efforts by the states. 18 Congress' lack of attention to the
problem, coupled with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in United
States v. Feola19 expanding the jurisdictional base of federal
conspiracy law to its virtual limit, suggest the need for a
reevaluation of what has resulted.
II.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The Constitution itself is very sparing in granting explicit
criminal law authority to the federal government. Piracy and
felonies on the high seas,2 0 treason against the United States, 21 and
counterfeiting of United States currency 22 illustrate the limited scope
of constitutional language delegating unambiguous criminal enforcement power to national authorities. Legislation implementing
these grants of authority, 23 therefore, derives its jurisdictional basis
directly from specific delegations of criminal law enforcement
powers.
The power to utilize the criminal law, however, need not be
explicitly delegated in order to be employed. In particular, by virtue
of the "necessary and proper" clause 24 and the very extensive scope
of the national government's power, 25 criminal sanctions are
appropriate as a vehicle to implement other grants of authority.
Thus, where the Constitution grants the federal government
authority to establish a United States system of courts and mails, for
example, Congress can ensure the integrity of those institutions
through criminal legislation, such being a necessary and proper
technique. 26 Similarly, areas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
17. Even with the extensive federal criminal jurisdiction conferred by Congress
under existing law, it remains true that federal authorities frequently decline to act in
favor of state prosecution. In addition to the mere existence of federal jurisdiction, at
least one of the following factors are usually required before federal action will be
taken: the impracticality of local investigation of a complex interstate crime, greater
federal expertise or effectiveness in the investigation of the crime in question, and
local corruption or incompetence. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 52-57.

18. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187 (1959).
19. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(10).
21. Id. art. III, § 3(1).
22. Id. art. I, § 8(6).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (falsification of coins); id. § 1651 (piracy); id. § 2381
(treason).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(18).
25. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (equal protection clause);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (commerce clause).
26. The judicial power is authorized in article III of the Constitution and enforced
through criminal penalties contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1970). Similarly, the
postal authority granted to the federal government in article I, section 8(7) of the
Constitution is supported by criminal legislation in id. §§ 1691-1737 (1970).
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United States government are appropriately regulated by federal
27
criminal law.
Common to the jurisdictional bases of these kinds of federal
criminal statutes are direct infringements of national interests,
whether territorial, property, institutional, or functional.2 Counterfeiting United States currency, bribing a federal judge, or committing an assault in a territory administered by the federal government all directly interfere with federal responsibilities. Any impact
that the underlying conduct might have on the states is only
incidental and ancillary to its challenge to the exercise of federal
authority. Thus, since the harm in this area most directly affects the
federal government, primary or exclusive control by federal
29
authorities is in order.
Federal criminal legislation, however, has moved far beyond the
narrow strictures of controlling conduct directly or primarily
threatening national interests. And with such movement has come
an exacerbation of policy conflicts between state and federal
authorities. For example, a suspect accused of stealing an article
from a postal employee faces the possibility of both state and federal
charges. 30 Yet, differences in prosecution, sentencing, and parole
patterns may exist between the federal and state systems, and the
exercise of jurisdiction by one may serve to undercut the policy
interests of the other. 31 Such tensions may have to be tolerated
where federal interests are of sufficient importance, as is arguably
the case for statutes protecting the integrity of the postal system.
However, where there is no significant federal interest, there is less
justification in creating the potential for conflict.
The broadest expansion of federal jurisdiction has occurred in
areas where federal interests are not directly threatened or where the
threat to state concerns is clearly primary. Offenses which have
traditionally been matters of state concern, such as prostitution and
27. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3(2); 18 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7 (1970).
28. Professor Louis Schwartz has called this area "federal self-defensive criminal
jurisdiction." Schwartz, Federal CriminalJurisdictionand Prosecutor'sDiscretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 66-70 (1948).
29. The Brown Commission has recommended a provision establishing the
nonpreemptive character of federal jurisdiction. BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, § 206.
Thus, it calls for concurrent jurisdiction; but action by a state or the federal
government may bar the other from proceeding. Id. §§ 707, 708. Existing case law is to
the contrary. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187 (1959).
30. Theft of mail from a mail carrier is punishable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1708
(1970). State jurisdiction would arise by virtue of the crime occurring within the
physical confines of the state.
31. It is conceivable that a postal theft might qualify for a diversion program in
the state system but not in the federal one, thereby reflecting divergent prosecution
policies. The possibilities of differing sentences and parole decisions are readily
apparent.
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gambling, are now subject to federal control if a state line is crossed
32
or an interstate facility, such as the mails or telephone, used.
Federal authority has entered these arenas not to protect its own
interests, but rather to aid state efforts or undercut state laxity.
Oddly enough, the social changes that have made federal assistance
necessary have also made it difficult to avoid running afoul of
33
federal power.
Federal criminal statutes that are, as labeled by Professor Louis
Schwartz, "auxiliary to state law enforcement" 34 efforts require
restraint in their creation. While they may serve an important
function, they bring with them these possible disadvantages:
To enlist the federal power in the battle against obscenity,
lotteries, theft, alcoholism, and prostitution is not to protect
federal prestige but to hazard it; it does not solve federal
administrative problems but creates new ones; it does not
vindicate federal authority in matters of distinctively national
concern against possible local obstruction, but steps into local
issues. Federal intervention also has a tendency to weaken the
enforcement efforts of state authorities. 35
Moreover, given the fact that the states and the federal government
are separate sovereigns, such statutes create the risk of multiple
prosecutions, convictions, and sentences for what is essentially a
36
single underlying crime.
Although some of these risks are present in nonauxiliary federal
criminal statutes, the importance of the federal -interests involved
requires that the risks be assumed. Where, however, the federal
criminal interest is only auxiliary, the decision to undertake
enforcement and risk the disadvantages -requires more thoughtful
consideration. How much is to be gained through federal assistance?
How lax or inefficient are the state enforcement mechanisms? What
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). This section prohibits travel in interstate or
foreign commerce or use of an interstate facility to, among other things, "facilitate"
unlawful activity, defined to include an extensive array.of offenses. It has.been said to
almost reach "the logical limit of the use of such traditional jurisdictional bases as
travel, transportation or communication in commerce." WORKING PAPERS, supra note
1, at 37. The Brown Commission's "piggyback" jurisdiction proposal would add a new
twist to allow further federal enforcement of traditionally state controlled conduct.
BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, § 201(b).
33. It is difficult to avoid use of the mails or telephones in many kinds of
activities covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). Even if one does, it is still no guarantee,
for federal jurisdiction may nevertheless arise because the conduct still "affects
commerce" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
34. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 70-83.
35. Id. at 70.
36. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959).
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costs are likely to ensue? These are among the general factors to be
37
weighed.
Presumably, as the disadvantages of auxiliary federal enforcement exceed the advantages, the enactment of such legislation
becomes less likely. Yet, the existence of a large number of
commerce-related federal offenses 38 suggests that Congress has seen
the need for broad federal criminal authority to supplement state
enforcement. Nevertheless, through judicial efforts, some limitation
on the scope of federal authority arose in the prosecution of
conspiracy offenses. Two reasons for limited federal involvement
can be present. First, if the offense is an auxiliary one and the
federal interest is simply to supplement state enforcement, there is
less reason to involve federal prestige. Second, where the charge is a
conspiracy and the conspiratorial object has not been achieved, the
result is an inchoate crime and an even more distant threat to
federal interests.
The substantive means by which federal involvement was
limited was the Crimmins doctrine, developed by Judge Learned
Hand.3 9 In essence, it required that the prosecution prove at least
knowledge by the defendants of the federal jurisdictional elements of
a conspiracy in order to secure a conviction. Recently, however, the
Supreme Court ° rejected the doctrine and substantially broadened
the opportunities for federal conspiracy prosecutions. Both the scope
and implications of the Court's approach, however, have raised
troublesome problems of law and policy.

III. Crimmins AND Feola
United States v. Crimmins41 involved a prosecution for conspiracy to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce. The
defendant, an attorney from Syracuse, was offered and purchased
stolen securities. He did so under circumstances which justified a
conclusion that he knew at the sale that the securities were stolen,
but no evidence was presented as to his awareness that the securities
42
were stolen in another state.
The facts of the Crimmins case gave rise to two possible federal
prosecutions. First, the defendant could have been charged with the
37. See

WORKING PAPERS,

supra note 1, at 51-57; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 73-

77.
38. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1970) (bribery in sports); id. § 1084 (transmission of
wagering information); id. § 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence).
39. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941).
40. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
41. 123 F.2d 271 (2d, Cir. 1941). The interstate transportation of stolen goods
statute is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
42. 123 F.2d at 272.
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substantive offense of transporting stolen securities in interstate
commerce as an aider and abettor. The court theorized that by
providing a market for the stolen securities, Crimmins would have
"caused" them to be transported in interstate commerce. 43 Second,
upon proof of an agreement to purchase the stolen securities, the
elements of a conspiracy charge were satisfied. 44 Potentially critical
to both charges, however, was the absence of the defendant's
awareness of the interstate character of the securities he knew were
stolen.
Clearly, had the defendant been prosecuted in the courts of the
state of New York, conviction upon substantive and conspiracy
charges for receipt of stolen securities would have withstood attack
on appeal. However, prosecution in a federal court requires some
basis for the assertion of federal authority. The "jurisdictional peg"
in Crimmins was the interstate character of the stolen securities, but
it was a feature of the transaction about which Crimmins was
unaware.
Judge Hand was willing to assume, without deciding, that proof
of the defendant's knowledge of the interstate character of the stolen
securities was unnecessary for a conviction on a substantive charge
45
of causing the interstate transportation of stolen securities.
Nevertheless, he felt that such proof was essential to support a
conspiracy conviction. In Judge Hand's view, the prosecution could
have met its burden by demonstrating, directly or circumstantially,
that Crimmins was aware that some of the bonds he purchased were
stolen out of state. Alternatively, proof that an implied term of the
conspiracy agreement was a willingness to purchase securities from
any source would have sufficed "for such an agreement would have
' 46
dealt with the place of the theft.
Judge Hand's basis for reaching his conclusion that the
defendant must be shown to have been 'aware of the interstate
element in an interstate conspiracy was succinctly stated:
[E]ach conspirator is chargeable with the acts of his fellows
done in furtherance of the joint venture; but into that must be
read the condition that acts so imputed must be in execution of
the venture as all understand it; not indeed in its details, but so
far as concerns those terms which constitute the substantive
47
crime.
43. Id. at 273.
44. See note 14 supra.
45. 123 F.2d at 273. The assumption was made, however, in the face of precedent
to the contrary involving a similar statute. See Davidson v. United States, 61 F.2d 250
(8th Cir. 1932).
46. 123 F.2d at 273.
47. Id.
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The underlying offense in Crimmins was causing the interstate
transportation of stolen securities. In Judge Hand's view, each of the
elements of the offense must be shown to have been part of the
understanding of the conspirators. Thus, since the interstate
transportation feature of the stolen securities was defined as part of
the offense, this must be shown to have been part of the
understanding of the group. 48 Without an awareness of the
securities' interstate character, the conspirators' agreement obviously could not have embraced that element. Thus, there was at
most a conspiracy to deal in stolen securities, not a conspiracy
involving interstate stolen securities.
Although awareness of the interstate aspects of the scheme was
found necessary to support a conspiracy charge, the Crimmins court
was willing to assume that such evidence was unnecessary to
support a conviction for the underlying offense. The seeming
inconsistency presented was that one could be guilty of causing
stolen securities to be transported in interstate commerce without
being aware of the interstate character of the securities but could not
be convicted of a conspiracy to achieve that object under the same
circumstances. Judge Hand's answer to this analytical difficulty
was the traffic light analogy: "While one may, for instance, be guilty
of running past a traffic light of whose existence one is ignorant, one
cannot be guilty of conspiring to run past such a light, for one
cannot agree to run past a light unless one supposes that there is a
light to run past. '49 Regardless of the basis of liability for the object
offense, a conspiracy agreement must embrace every element of the
offense to support a conspiracy conviction.
The Crimmins doctrine can be analyzed in terms of both its
theoretical and its practical impact. Central to criminal law theory is
the concept of mens rea - the guilty mind which must accompany
the forbidden conduct before criminal liability will attach.5 0 With the
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970). This section provides in relevant ifrt: "Whoever
transports in interstate. . . commerce any . . . securities. . . of the value of $5,000 or
more, knowing the same to have been stolen. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." The statute calls for an awareness
that the securities were stolen. Judge Hand's view apparently was that awareness of
every element would be necessary in a conspiracy prosecution, including the
knowledge that the items were securities, of a value greater than $5,000, were stolen,
and had an interstate character.
49. 123 F.2d at 273.
50. Judge Hand stated:
Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all
those facts which make his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that is meant
by the mens rea, the "criminal intent," necessary to guilt, as distinct from the
additional specific intent required in certain circumstances.
Id. at, 272 (citation omitted). Criminal code revisions following the Model Penal Code
accept the notion that negligence can be the basis of criminal culpability, defined as
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exception of strict liability crimes,5 1 mens rea is an essential
component of every offense. However, the application of mens rea
theory to criminal conduct is more complex than simply looking for
a generalized evil disposition on the part of a defendant. Rather, the
structure of criminal offenses requires that they be broken down into
their constituent elements - the forbidden act, surrounding
circumstances, and result. 52 The defendant must be shown to have

had the requisite mens rea for each constituent element of the crime.
In the Crimmins fact situation, the court was willing to concede
the possibility that no mens rea was necessary as to the interstate
feature of the substantive crime - that the offense was one of strict
liability as to that element. 53 But, in a conspiracy to achieve the
same object, the court apparently reasoned that the analysis must
change: a conspiracy, being an agreement to achieve all of the
elements of the underlying substantive crime, requires some mens
rea as to each element even if the substantive crime does not. Thus,
while substantive offenses may have strict liability elements,
conspiracy charges cannot contain such elements.
The Crimmins analysis, of course, arose in the context of a
particular underlying substantive crime which was the object of the
conspiracy. But the approach was equally applicable to any federal
conspiracy charge, in particular to the element of the offense
conveying federal jurisdiction. Federal conspiracy prosecutions
involving interstate commerce or the use of interstate facilities could
be limited through the application of the Crimmins rationale and
indeed were so limited in those courts adhering to Judge Hand's
opinion. 54 Thus, the Crimmins theory brought with it a practical
consequence involving a restriction on the growth of federal criminal
power in the conspiracy field.
occurring when the defendant "should be aware" that a material element of an
offense exists. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2Xd) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODE]. The Code's other standards of culpability
are premised upon the defendant's awareness of the facts constituting the crime. Id.
§ 2.02(2)(a)-(c).
51. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
52. The Code defines elements of an offense to include conduct, attendant
circumstances, or result. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 50, § 1.13(9); see W. LAFAvE
& A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 194-95 (1972).
53. 123 F.2d at 273. The court also noted other statutes with strict liability
elements such as statutory rape and adultery, citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165
Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896), and State v. Audette, 81 Vt. 400, 70 A. 833 (1908).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub.
nom., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975); United States v. Garafola, 471 F.2d
291 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Vilhotti, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 911 (1970); United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1948).
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The Crimmins doctrine received a mixed reception in the federal
courts 55 until the Supreme Court's decision to tackle the problem in

United States v. Feola.5 6 In contrast to Crimmins, which involved an
interstate commerce conspiracy, Feola was concerned with a
conspiracy to assault a federal officer. 57 However, the basic
analytical problem was the same. In each case the element of the
substantive offense conveying federal jurisdiction required no proof
of mens rea. This proposition was assumed by Judge Hand in
Crimmins58 and decided directly by the Supreme Court in Feola
when it ruled that lack of awareness that the victim of an assault is
a federal officer is no defense to a charge of assaulting a federal
officer. 59 While the Crimmins court had ruled that the defendant
must be shown to have been aware of the interstate character of the
stolen bonds when charged with conspiracy, the Supreme Court held
that no awareness of the federal status of the victim need be proven
under a charge of conspiracy to assault a federal officer.
The Supreme Court, in order to refute Judge Hand, had to
discredit the appealing logic of Crimmins. After all, a charge of
conspiracy does not exist in the abstract, but rather, the essence of a
conspiracy is to agree to perform an act which is forbidden. Insofar
as the forbidden conduct in Feola involved assaulting a federal
officer, how can a defendant have agreed to such an act if he did not
know his victim was a federal officer?
In essence, the Supreme Court chose to adopt the Government's
plea for symmetry in the treatment of substantive and conspiracy
charges. 60 The mens rea requirements for the offense that the
conspiracy sought to achieve were simply carried over to the
conspiracy charge, including strict liability elements. The Court
could find no support for the Crimmins theory in the general
conspiracy statute and therefore concluded that where "the substantive statute does not require that an assailant know the official
status of his victim, there is nothing on the face of the conspiracy
55. The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits rejected the Crimmins rule. United
States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1973) affd mem., 420 U.S. 770 (1975);
United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 918
(1973); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924
(1971). Other courts, as noted in Feola, were able to find sufficient evidence of antifederal intent from the record. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 689-90 (1975);
United States v. Iacovetti, 466 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 908
(1973); United States v. McGann, 431 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
919 (1971); Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1966); Clark v. United
States, 213 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1954).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

420 U.S. 671 (1975); see 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 126 (1975).
420 U.S. at 673; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 371, 372 (1970).
See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
420 U.S. at 677-86.
Id. at 676.
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statute that would seem to require that those agreeing to the assault
''
have a greater degree of knowledge. 61
The Court then rejected the traffic light analogy as inapposite
and observed that the question of whether it is fair to punish parties
to an agreement to engage intentionally in innocent conduct which
results in violation of a statute was not presented to the court in
either Feola or Crimmins.6 2 If an actor is unaware of the existence of
a traffic light, that actor is clearly contemplating legitimate conduct.
However, a plan to purchase stolen securities or commit an assault
involves clearly wrongful conduct whether or not the interstate
character of the securities or the official status of the victim is
known to the parties. The traffic light analogy was thus confined to
the realm of regulatory offenses in which proof of the act alone is
63
sufficient for ciminal liability and thus may retain some validity.
The substance of the Crimmins decision, however, was Judge
Hand's view that a conspirator's liability extends only as far as
those terms reasonably within the scope of his agreement. The Court
rephrased the issue in the context of Feola as "not merely whether
the official status of an assaulted victim was known to the parties at
the time of their agreement, but whether the acts contemplated by
the conspirators are to be deemed legally different from those
actually performed solely because of the official identity of the
victim. ' '6 In short, symmetry requires equal treatment in terms of
the mens rea for both substantive and conspiracy charges, a
conclusion reached by the Court without directly tackling Judge
Hand's view that conspiracy liability should extend no further than
65
the terms of the agreement as understood by the parties.
The Feola and Crimmins rationales, while leading to opposite
conclusions, do not directly take issue with each other. Instead they
pose interesting questions that are left unanswered. Crimmins
does not explain why awareness of an element can be irrelevant to
liability for acts performed but not for acts planned; Feola does not
articulate how a defendant can become party to an agreement when
some of its terms are unknown to him. Perhaps a proper resolution of
the problem lies not so much in criminal law theory, but in an
61. Id. at 687.
62. Id. at 690-91.
63. The Court noted the closeness of the position to the Powell doctrine, People v.
Powell, 63 N.Y. 88 (1875) (requiring proof of a corrupt motive in conspiracy), but
declined to rule on the issue. 420 U.S. at 691.
64. 420 U.S. at 692-93.
65. The Court noted that conspirators may be liable "for acts the precise details of
which one does not know at the time of the agreement." Id. at 692, citing Blumenthal
v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947). This is not the same as lack of awareness of
an element of the offense as defined by the statute.
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accommodation of conspiracy doctrine and the unique attributes of
federal jurisdiction.
IV.

CONSPIRACY REFORM AND ANTI-FEDERAL INTENT

Feola and Crimmins share in common the fact that each was a
federal conspiracy prosecution for acts which could also have been
prosecuted under state law. Crimmins had clearly been in receipt of
stolen goods while Feola's conduct amounted to a traditional
assault. 66 In each case, however, federal prosecution was possible
because of the existence of federal legislation converting traditional
state crimes into federal ones by merely adding an additional
element to convey the necessary jurisdiction. In Crimmins, the
requisite jurisdiction was accomplished by requiring that the stolen
securities have an interstate character, 67 while the statute in Feola
established federal jurisdiction by requiring a federal victim of the
68
assault.
Is there, then, something unique about the element of a federal
offense which serves to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts for
these violations of statutory prohibitions? In one sense the answer
must be no. Whether or not the element in question is jurisdictional,
the element must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
satisfy due process requirements, a conclusion which the Feola Court
conceded. 69 However, proving that the jurisdictional element exists
beyond a reasonable doubt may in another sense be different from
the proof required for other elements. Certainly, the jurisdictional
element must exist. In Crimmins, this rule imposed a requirement
that the stolen securities have an interstate character, and in Feola,
it meant that the intended victim of the assault in fact had to have
the necessary official federal status. But there is a difference
between proving the existence of the jurisdictional facts and proving
the defendant's awareness of their existence. For the Feola Court
that distinction was critical, for while it accepted the need to prove
the existence of the jurisdictional element, the Court refused to
require any further inquiry on the point. 70 In this manner, the Court
66. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696-713 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
68. See id. § 111.
69. See 420 U.S. at 676-77 n.9.
70. Id. The Court observed:
The significance of labeling a statutory requirement as "jurisdictional" is not that
the requirement is viewed as outside the scope of the evil Congress intended to
forestall, but merely that the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction
need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made
criminal by the federal statute.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 2

1976-1977]

CONSPIRACY AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

placed jurisdictional elements in a class apart from other material
elements of federal criminal offenses. -In contrast, :the Crimmins'
Court chose to 'treat the federal jurisdictional .element as anY other
element of a conspirator's object crime -and thus required that it be
part of the agreement as the conspirators understood it.
As a matter of theory and practice, is it appropriate to treat the
jurisdictional element in a federal conspiracy in the manner
suggested by Feola? Because the only significance of the element is
to confer federal jurisdiction, there may be no showing of the mens
rea required for substantive liability. 71 If prosecuted as a conspiracy,
then, as the Government argued in Feola, symmetry should mean no
72
differing treatment for the mens rea of the jurisdictional element.
On the other hand, the nonjurisdictional elements of the offense will
have a mens rea component which will be carried into the
conspiracy charge. This leaves the jurisdictional element as the only
one for which there may be strict liability, 73 a result which appears
unsymmetrical. However, the nature of conspiracy doctrine and the
need to balance federal and state law enforcement authority may
help to reconcile the theoretical dilemma of Crimmins and Feola.
Moreover, these factors may be relevant to the manner in which the
courts flesh out the scope and implications of the Feola decision.
Conspiracy is unique in the arsenal of criminal law weapons in
the degree to which it permits early intervention for the suppression
of crime. The agreement to commit an act within the scope of the
conspiracy law net is itself sufficient to support a conspiracy
conviction, a point that can substantially precede conduct constituting an attempt to commit an offense.7 4 The doctrine is aimed at the
special dangers posed by group criminal activity, including the
supposed greater likelihood of success, increased organization and
heightened opportunity for future crime, as well as the decreased
chance of abandonment posed by conspiratorial groupings, all
factors which purport to justify the extremely early criminal law
75
intervention.
71. Id. at 677-86. Similarly, the Model Penal Code excludes such jurisdictional
elements from its definition of material offense elements. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra
note 50, § 1.13(10). The Code's culpability provisions, moreover, relate only to material
elements of the offense. Id. § 2.02.
72. See 420 U.S. at 676.
73. Regulatory offenses are the one possible exception subject to the Court's view
on the Powell doctrine issue. Id. at 690-91.
74. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 52, at 460-61. In jurisdictions requiring
substantial proximity to completion of the crime for attempt liability, conspiracy
permits much earlier intervention since the agreement does not have to be sufficiently
proximate. See, e.g., People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927).
75. See Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920,
923-24 (1959).
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The logic that supports the conspiracy concept has not allowed
the doctrine to escape severe criticism. There are inherent weaknesses in group criminal conduct that may increase the chances of
abandonment or detection, 76 thereby undercutting the justification
for early intervention. Beyond the theoretical conflict over conspiracy, however, lies substantial concern over the doctrine's potential
for abuse in terms of the conduct to which it may be applied and the
procedural consequences of its application. Vagueness of the
conspiracy concept, 77 special rules of evidence utilized in conspiracy
prosecutions, 78 and the undermining of venue protections 79 are
among the attributes of conspiracy doctrine which are cause for
concern. Moreover, conduct which is not criminal in itself may be
converted into an offense through the conspiracy route,8 0 and
because conspiracy and the criminal object do not merge, the
prosecution may convert the entire episode into multiple convictions
and punishments. 81 Since the essence of the offense circumvents so
many traditional safeguards and since the application can be easily
abused, the scope of the conspiracy offense must be kept within
bounds. 82 Such an effort lies at the heart of Crimmins but was
abandoned by Feola.
The Supreme Court in Feola correctly asserted that the
Crimmins rule had become one of the features of conspiracy doctrine
76. A number of recent conspiracy prosecutions indicate that more participants in
a criminal scheme may make it that much easier to infiltrate the group. E.g., United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See
also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413-14
(1959).
77. Mr. Justice Jackson stated that "[tihe modem crime of conspiracy is so vague
that it almost defies definition." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03,
Comment at 106-07 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 10];
Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1122, 1129-35 (1975).
78. The co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of
statements made by a conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy to be
admitted against all conspirators. See generally Comment, The Hearay Exception
for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHi. L. REV. 530 (1958). Although such
statements are supposed to be admitted only upon proof of the conspiracy, the
"conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon the assumption
that conspiracy existed." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
79. Venue may be in the place of agreement or at any location where an overt act
was committed by any conspirator. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 52, at 45657; Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 975-78
(1959).
80. See generally Goldstein, supra note 76, at 405; Note, supra note 77, at 1122,
1129-35.
81. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
82. It has also been forcefully argued that control of the doctrine is the wrong
solution; rather, conspiracy ought to be abolished. E.g., Johnson; The Unnecessary
Crime. of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137-39 (1973).
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subjected to criticism.83 In particular, the Model Penal Code 84 and
85
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
had rejected the broad sweep of Crimmins in their recommendations.
However, a closer look at their views is in order.
The Model Penal Code commentary on its conspiracy provisions
urged that jurisdictional elements in federal conspiracy prosecutions
be recognized frankly as such rather than as elements of the
substantive offense.8 6 The question would then become whether or
not federal jurisdiction exists rather than the knowledge of the
parties. If the crime had in fact been committed, jurisdiction would
exist; jurisdiction would also exist if the parties contemplated the
jurisdictional element. The commentary proceeds to state that "in
situations where the jurisdictional circumstance neither exists nor
was in contemplation of the parties, it would be clear that
87
jurisdiction simply cannot be affirmed."
Under the Model Penal Code reasoning, it would be possible to
distinguish between different jurisdictional sources in the handling
of federal conspiracy charges. First, if the conspiracy had achieved
its object, jurisdiction would be deemed to exist. If it had failed, the
need to determine whether the jurisdictional circumstance was in the
contemplation of the parties would depend upon the basis upon
which jurisdiction is established. If it is a preexisting factor, even
though commission of the criminal object lies in the future, then
jurisdiction would in fact be established. This would have been the
case in Feola if the victim of the conspiracy to assault had been
identified in advance and was in fact a federal official. 88 The same
reasoning would apply to the facts in Crimmins, a conspiracy to
receive stolen interstate securities, if the conspiracy arose or took
place after the securities had acquired their interstate character.8 9 If
the conspiracy had not achieved its federally prohibited object nor
did the jurisdictional element arise before or during the conspiracy,
awareness of the jurisdictional requirement would seem to be
necessary under the Model Penal Code formulation. In other words,
83. 420 U.S. at 690 n.23.
84. Tent. Draft No. 10, supra note 77, §5.03, Comment at 110-13.
85. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 388-89. See also Developments in the Law
- Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 937-40 (1959).
86. The commentary states: "[T]he problem might be greatly simplified if
Congress were to view these circumstances not as an element of the respective crimes
but frankly as a basis for establishing federal jurisdiction." Tent. Draft No. 10, supra
note 77, §5.03, Comment at 112 (footnotes omitted).

87. Id.
88. See 420 U.S. at 674-76. The circumstances are developed more fully in the
court of appeals decision. See United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).

89. Crimmins seemed to have entered the picture after the stolen securities had
crossed state lines. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941).
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where the jurisdictional element does not exist in fact, the Code
would require that the conspirators be shown to be aware of its likely
existence in the future.
The Model Penal Code's qualified rejection of Crimmins is
consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Feola since the facts,
namely that the criminal object had been achieved, fall within the
category of situations in which awareness of the jurisdictional
element need not be proved. However, there is a danger that Feola
will not be read in this manner and that future courts will dispense
with an inquiry into the conspirators' mental attitudes towards the
jurisdictional element in all situations.9 0 The Supreme Court's
reference to the Model Penal Code's rejection of the Crimmins rule,
therefore, must be read in light of the Code's own qualification of its
position.
Additionally, the Model Penal Code position on the Crimmins
rule was part of an overall reform of conspiracy doctrine, not an
isolated position. Among the Code's major contributions are a
requirement that the object of the conspiracy be itself a criminal
offense;91 rejection of automatic liability for the substantive crimes
of -the conspiracy based solely upon the defendant's status as a coconspirator; 92 a demand that the defendant have specifically
intended to achieve the illegal result of the conspiracy; 93 and the
imposition of an overt act requirement. 94 Moreover, the Code rejects
the prevailing view that a defendant may always be convicted and
sentenced for both conspiracy and the object offense, 95 and offers
criteria to solve conspiracy joinder and venue problems. 96 Needless
to say, Feola offers none of these reforms in return for its rejection of
Crimmins. Such changes must await legislative action, 97 a delay the
Supreme Court was apparently unwilling to accept in ruling on the
Crimmins problem. The result, however, was the adoption of a very
small part of the Model Penal Code's comprehensive conspiracy
reform package. One can only speculate whether the American Law
90. But see 420 U.S. at 695-96.
91. Tent. Draft No. 10, supra note 77, § 5.03, Comment at 102-04. The progress of
statutory reform based on the Model Penal Code's conspiracy provisions is surveyed
in Note, supra note 77, at 1122.
92. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt.
2), 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1004 (1961).

93. Tent. Draft No. 10, supra note 77, § 5.03, Comment at 107-10.
94. Id. at 140-42; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (imposing an overt act requirement in
the federal conspiracy statute).
95. Tent. Draft No. 10, supra note 77, § 5.03, Comment at 98-99.
96. Id. at 135-39.
97. Ironically, the lower court in Feola implied that revision of the Crimmins rule
should await legislative change. United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
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Institute would have proposed its approach to Crimmins apart from
its other recommendations and whether, standing alone, that single
change furthers or retards the Code's overall criminal law objectives.
Similarly, as observed by the Court in Feola, the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Commission)
appears to reject the Crimmins doctrine. 98 While its treatment of the
problem is not as thorough as that of the Model Penal Code, the fact
that the Commission cites both the Code's conspiracy provisions and
commentary 99 suggests the likelihood that it would accept the Code's
overall approach, including the necessity to demonstrate awareness
of the jurisdictional element in a limited class of cases. Moreover, the
Commission, like the Code, offers substantial reform of conspiracy
doctrine of which the rejection of the Crimmins rule is only a small
part.'0 0 Again, the Supreme Court may well have taken a single
Commission recommendation out of context.
If the conspiracy doctrine is indeed an area of the law in need of
substantial internal reform as well as being a charge easily abused
in its application,' 1 it might be well to keep the doctrine in check
until reforms have been implemented. Such is the result accomplished by Crimmins and abandoned by Feola. The Supreme Court
has given wider application to the unreformed law of conspiracy, a
specific result nowhere recommended. The Court did not even
consider this consequence in reaching its conclusion in Feola,
although the theoretical impasse inherent in the problem suggests
the need to consider other factors in arriving at a solution.
The jurisdictional implications of the Crimmins-Feola controversy offer another set of variables to assist in reaching a solution.
The substantive federal crimes to which conspiracy charges may be
attached present the full range of possible jurisdictional sources for
federal prosecutions.' 0 2 Some may focus upon direct threats to
federal interests,' 0 3 while others may rest upon the broad federal
98. 420 U.S. at 690 n.23; BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, §204; WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 388-89.
99. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 389 n.25.
100. See generally BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, § 1004; WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 381-402. For a comparison of the Brown Commission and Model Penal Code
conspiracy formulas, see generally Note, supra note 77, at 1122.
101. Mr. Justice Jackson noted: "[1It is for prosecutors rather than courts to
determine when to use a scatter-gun to bring down the defendent. .. ." Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The ease of abuse
arises from the total lack of criteria governing the prosecutor's determination.
102. There is no jurisdictional base for the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1970). Federal jurisdiction arises from the fact that a federal offense is the
object, thereby picking up the jurisdictional base of the object offense; jurisdiction also
arises if the United States is the fraud target.
103. Id. § 471 (counterfeiting United States securities).
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power over interstate commerce. 10 4 The latter are more likely to

reflect auxiliary federal criminal legislation which is supplementary
to state law enforcement. The more active the federal government is
in this area, the more it duplicates and perhaps infringes upon state
activities.
Nevertheless, if the broad exercise of federal jurisdiction is both
intended by Congress and constitutional in character, the courts are
bound to enforce it. The task of determining the intent behind and
propriety of an assertion of federal jurisdiction for each substantive
offense is a difficult one, but the specific jurisdictional problem in
Feola and Crimmins is the even more complex question of resolving
these questions in the context of a conspiracy prosecution.
The Feola Court's analysis of the jurisdictional problem is
reflected in its conclusion that "[t]he general conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 371, offers no textual support for the proposition that to be
guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect must have known that his
conduct violated federal law."1 5 In other words, once the Court
concluded that Congress had intended a broad assertion of federal
jurisdiction in the offense of assaulting a federal officer by
eliminating the need for a showing of the defendant's awareness of
the jurisdictional element, 10 6 the conspiracy statute's language
provided no basis for finding that any different jurisdictional scope
was intended for a conspiracy to assault a federal officer.
While the language of the conspiracy statute may not resolve the
problem, it is not necessarily true that Congress sought to sweep
many state criminal offenses into federal courts. It is possible to
classify - the underlying statutes in making the jurisdictional
judgment. First would come an assessment of the character of
federal jurisdiction in the substantive crime. Is such jurisdiction
based upon a direct threat to a national interest or is the basis of
jurisdiction auxiliary in character? If the latter is the source of
federal authority, federal interests suffer less, if at all, if the
jurisdictional power is less forcefully exercised, a result accomplished by requiring demonstration of the anti-federal intent of the
defendant. Where, in contrast, the logic behind the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is to protect an exclusive or primary national interest,
there is more reason to assume the desirability of utilizing federal
authority as extensively in the suppression of inchoate conspiracies
to threaten that interest as in the control of the substantive conduct
itself.
104. Id. § 2312 (transporting stolen vehicles interstate).
105. 420 U.S. at 687 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 677-86.
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The facts of the Feola case can be classified as representing a
direct threat to federal interests. The fact that an assault on a
federal officer is also a crime under state law does not alter the
legitimacy and primacy of the federal goal of protecting its own
personnel. 10 7 Although the Court did not so suggest, other statutes
representing the auxiliary federal jurisdiction mold might be
distinguished on that basis and treated under the Crimmins
doctrine.
Much in the Feola opinion suggests that the Court would not
accept retention of the Crimmins rule for auxiliary jurisdiction
statutes. The Court in Feola recognized two independent values of
the conspiracy doctrine: protecting society from concerted criminal
groupings and allowing social intervention prior to commission of
the prohibited act. 0 8 From these values, the Court concluded that
"imposition of a requirement of knowledge of those facts that serve
only to establish federal jurisdiction would render it more difficult to
serve the policy behind the law of conspiracy without serving any
other apparent social policy." 10 9 Quite clearly, the Court did not view
as confining the exercise of federal auxiliary jurisdiction in the
treatment of the controversial doctrine of conspiracy as a countervailing social policy.
Much of the ease with which the Court arrived at its conclusion
can be attributed to the absence of any clear policy behind the
conspiracy statute and its jurisdictional attributes. Although
Congress enacted the conspiracy statute, the features of the doctrine
have been fleshed out by the courts. 110 Moreover, conspiracy is an
inchoate offense which is tacked on to a substantive charge."' A
Congress that does not deal with all the internal features of such an
offense can hardly be expected to have thought through the
implications of tying conspiracy to each and every other federal
crime. The same lack of thought can be expected as new federal
offenses are enacted. The Court has simply assumed that the widest
possible scope is appropriate, and policies of restricting the scot1e of
a severely criticized doctrine such as conspiracy and controlling a
107. The Court observed: "If the primary purpose is to protect federal law
enforcement personnel, that purpose could well be frustrated by the imposition of a
strict scienter requirement." Id. at 678.
108. Id. at 693-94.
109. Id. at 694.
110. The Brown Commission, in contrast, seeks more statutory control of the
doctrine. BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, § 1004.
111. The conspiracy must have a forbidden, though not necessarily illegal, object.
See 18 U.S.C. §.371 (1970).
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burgeoning body of federal criminal law do not enter into the
11 2
equation.
One final consideration in the analysis of Feola deserves
mention. Under existing law, the fact of prosecution or conviction in
a state or federal court does not preclude further action by the other
for the same underlying conduct. 113 The state and federal governments are separate sovereigns, each of which is entitled to enforce its
criminal prohibitions." 4 In some instances, a single act will be
prosecuted differently by federal authorities because of the extrajurisdictional element which must be proven. 115 Thus, double
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing are possible. Little formal
legal progress has been made in controlling the opportunity for
abusive serial prosecutions by separate sovereigns. The Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code of the Brown Commission offers some
tentative suggestions for curtailing the practice, but they contain
substantial loopholes and at this stage are merely recommendations. 116 Internal policy may offer some help, 117 but the task of
developing consistent policy among all the states and the federal
government is enormous," 8 and it is not clear what legal force such
policy would have." 9 Federal auxiliary statutes are replete with
opportunities for multiple prosecutions, and a tactic that reduces
the potential for abuse, unlike Feola, serves a worthwhile purpose.
112. The dispute over the jurisdictional reach of the substantive federal officer
assault statute is illustrative of the problem encountered. 420 U.S. at 696-713
(Stewart, J., dissenting). If one is not certain how far Congress sought to reach when
the act is committed, it is less clear how far Congress would want to reach to deal with
agreements to commit the act if Congress bothered to consider the problem.
113. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959).
114. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959), quoting United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). See generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy and
Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REv. 607 (1966).
115. See generally Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 197 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
116. BROWN REPORT, supra note 4, §§ 707, 708. Perhaps the major loophole allows
for successive prosecutions when the two statutes are "intended to prevent a
substantially different harm or evil," even if the same underlying conduct is involved.
Id. §§ 707(a), 708(a). See also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 347-48.
117. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 58-60; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 8387.
118. It has been suggested that "the possibilities under such an approach do not
present practicable alternatives." WORKING PAPERS, supra note 1, at 61.
119. The Supreme Court has vacated judgments upon motion of the Solicitor
General when prosecutions have violated Justice Department policy. Redmond v.
United States, 355 F.2d 446 (6th Cir.), vacated, 384 U.S. 264 (1966); Petite v. United
States, 262 F.2d 788 (4th Cir.), vacated, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). The same result has
occurred upon request of the Court for Justice Department reconsideration. Cox v.
United States, 370 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1967). But see Orlando v. United States, 387 F.2d
348, 349 (9th Cir. 1967) (Pope, J., dissenting). Defendants, however, have not been
permitted to raise and litigate violations of internal policy. See Heath v. United
States, 375 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1967).
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SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS

Feola will not necessarily be the last decision to address the
treatment: of jurisdictional elements of federal conspiracy prosecutions. Aspects of the opinion itself and issues not dealt with by the
decision leave room for carving out exceptions. We know that a
conspiracy to assault a federal officer does not require a showing
that the defendant was aware of the official status of his victim.
Lower courts more sensitive to the potential abuses of conspiracy
law and multiple prosecutions, and more concerned about the
balance between the federal and state law enforcement power, may
view other federal conspiracy charges differently.
There is the risk, however, that lower courts will read Feola more
broadly than is justified by the opinion. If the issue is raised, the
courts should consider whether the substantive charge involved is
sufficiently similar to the assault offense in Feola to warrant
comparable treatment. A conclusion that "the Supreme Court has
put this issue to rest" 120 without analysis should be considered
inadequate.
Two post-Feola decisions in the courts of appeals illustrate that
a citation to Feola alone is insufficient to determine the treatment of
jurisdictional elements in federal conspiracy prosecutions. The
Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Newson,121 was confronted with a
charge of conspiracy to transport forged securities in interstate
commerce.1 22 The defendants had obtained stolen money orders
which, on their face, showed that they had been drawn on an out-ofstate institution. However, the substantive offense required no
showing of awareness of the interstate character of the stolen money
orders, and the court reached the same conclusion for conspiracy
prosecution. Rather than merely asserting the controlling force of
Feola, however, the court undertook a reasoned comparison, noting
that "in both statutes the federal element of the offense is
jurisdictional and the criminal intent, whether it be to assault
' 23
someone or pass forged securities, exists independently."'
The Sixth Circuit, also looking more deeply at the Feola logic,
has developed a limitation on the principle's scope. The defendants
125
24
in United States v. Prince were' charged with a Travel Act
120. United States v. Fairfield, 526 F.2d 8, 11 (8th Cir. 1975). See also United States
v. Muncy, 526 F.2d 1261, 1262-64 (5th Cir. 1976).
121. 531 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1976).
122. The substantive object offense is the same as in Crimmins. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (1970).
123. 531 F.2d at 982. See also United States v. Viruet, 539 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1976).
124. 529 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1976).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970); see note 32 supra.
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conspiracy, Prince being a West Virginia madam of a house of
prostitution earning money from the prostitution activities of a
woman who had crossed state lines for that purpose. Although the
Government had argued that, as in Feola, awareness of the
jurisdictional element was unnecessary, the court disagreed.
As in Newson, the Prince court sought to determine the general
similarity of the underlying substantive charges, concluding that the
Travel Act did not fit the Feola mold. The statute in Prince
criminalized travel in interstate commerce "with intent" to engage
in certain illegal activities including prostitution. Unlike the statute
in Fe'ola, which required only the general intent to assault, the
Princecourt felt the Travel Act imposed "a requirement of a separate
intent related to the use of interstate facilities which is different from
the intent required to commit the underlying State offense." 126 Had
the defendant actually traveled in interstate commerce, jurisdictional requirements would have been met, but without such travel,
awareness of the jurisdictional element was demanded. As the court
noted, the underlying statute was not simply a tool to convert a state
1 27
crime into a federal one.
The Feola Court itself suggested that in some circumstances a
conspiracy charge would require proof of the defendant's awareness
of the element of the offense conveying federal jurisdiction.128 In the
specific context of a conspiracy to assault a federal officer,
jurisdiction would be established by the completion of the assault or
identification of an intended victim who in fact has the necessary
official status. Absent these factors, the Court concluded that "it is
impossible to assert that the mere act of agreement to assault poses
a sufficient threat to federal personnel and functions so as to give
rise to federal jurisdiction.1' 29 The same principle would seemingly
apply to other conspiracies which have not obtained their illegal
objectives. For these conspiracies, some federal threat must be
present for juridiction to be established, a form of anti-federal intent
which the Court rejected for completed conspiracies.
In one way or another, it is essential that the Feola doctrine be
brought within reasonable bounds by the courts for several reasons.
First, the doctrine can easily become a tool for a broad and unwarranted expansion of federal jurisdiction. As stated by the Ninth
Circuit: "It is not the business of federal prosecutors to prosecute for
state offenses, or of federal courts to entertain such prosecutions.
And we think that federal courts must be on guard against attempts
126.
127.
128.
129.

529 F.2d at 1112.
Id. at 1111-12.
420 U.S. at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
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to convert what are essentially offenses against state laws into
federal crimes via the conspiracy route.1 130 Second, the expansion of
federal jurisdiction reflected in Feola comes in the field of conspiracy
law, a much criticized doctrine which is badly in need of reform.
Finally, the expanded federal power in no way limits the states from
exercising their concurrent power with the result that multiple
prosecutions and convictions for the same underlying conduct may
result.
Control of the serious side effects of Feola might make the
decision itself more palatable. Extensive criticism of the displaced
Crimmins rule suggests some change may have been called for in
the treatment of federal conspiracy prosecutions.13 ' However, the
change has preceded other more pressing reforms and indeed may
have made the overall situation worse. Had the Court weighed the
pragmatic outcome of Feola instead of analyzing the problem
exclusively from a theoretical perspective, the result might have
been different. Hopefully, lower courts, in applying the rule, will be
more conscious of the consequences of their decisions.
130. Twitchell v. United States, 313 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1963i (citations omitted).
131. See notes 84 & 85 supra.
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